In this paper we study the generalized version of weighted matching in bipartite networks. Consider a weighted matching in a bipartite network in which the nodes derive value from the split of the matching edge assigned to them if they are matched. The value a node derives from the split depends both on the split as well as the partner the node is matched to. We assume that the value of a split to the node is continuous and strictly increasing in the part of the split assigned to the node. A stable weighted matching is a matching and splits on the edges in the matching such that no two adjacent nodes in the network can split the edge between them so that both of them can derive a higher value than in the matching. We extend the weighted matching problem to this general case and study the existence of a stable weighted matching. We also present an algorithm that converges to a stable weighted matching. The algorithm generalizes the Hungarian algorithm for bipartite matching. Faster algorithms can be made when there is more structure on the value functions.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze the following problem. Consider a weighted matching in a bipartite network in which the nodes derive value from the split of the matching edge assigned to them if they are matched. The value a node derives from the split depends both on the split as well as the partner the node is matched to. We assume that the value of a split to the node is continuous and strictly increasing in the part of the split assigned to the node. A stable weighted matching is a matching and splits on the edges in the matching such that no two adjacent nodes in the network can split the edge between them so that both of them can derive a higher value than in the matching. We extend the weighted matching problem to this general case and study the existence of a stable weighted matching. We also present an algorithm that converges to a stable weighted matching. The algorithm generalizes the Hungarian algorithm [8] for bipartite matching. Faster algorithms can be made when there is more structure on the value functions.
Weighted matching in bipartite networks has been studied in the context of linear valuations [10] . The problem is often posed as such.
In a bipartite network S = (A ∪ B, E ⊆ A × B), whose nodes belong to A ∪ B and whose edges connect nodes from A to nodes in B with weights w (i, j) for the edge (i, j) that can be split between i and j as s i and s j to give them values V i = s i and V j = s j , find a matching M * with characteristic function χ M that maximizes the sum of weights of edges in the matching
The characteristic function χ M must satisfy the following constraints to be the characteristic function of a matching.
(i,j)∈E
χ (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E
The last constraint is an integer constraint and can be neglected since the corners of the polytope resulting from the remaining constraints are integral. The above is called the maximum weight matching problem. In a finite graph with finite weights, the optimal solution exists and the optimal value is finite. The stable matching problem is the dual of the maximum weight matching problem which is to find the minimum sum of values given to the nodes in the network min i∈A∪B V i (4) such that V i + V j ≥ w (i, j) , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (5)
The existence of a stable matching is evident from the finiteness of the optimal value in the maximum weight matching problem. In fact at optimal solution for the stable matching problem, for any edge (i, j) ∈ M * , V i + V j = w (i, j). For any maximum weighted matching, there exists splits s = V that is an optimal solution to the stable matching problem. This problem has been well understood and several algorithms have been proposed to find the optimal stable matching. The extensions, when the values V are increasing functions of the split and do not depend upon the edge, can be reduced to the above problem.
We study the problem when the values V depend upon the edge as well as the part of the split given to the node. The stable matching problem in this case is as such. Find a matching M
• and a split s such that
The existence of such a matching and a split is not evident. In this paper, we show that such a matching and a split exists and we give an algorithm to find such a matching and a split. The problem features in many practical problems. We give a few examples.
Consider the stable marriage problem and related problems studied in [4] and later by several others. A survey of related literature can be found in [9] . The classical formulation assumes exogeneous partner preferences. Other formulations including [1] study endogeneous partner preferences arising from types of partners. An important and more realistic formulation is to consider that utilities of individuals in a marriage depends both on the type or the identity of the partner as well as the effort the partner puts in the marriage. In this scenario, a stable marriage is the one in which the neither partner in the marriage has a proposal for mariage in which the partner will have a higher utility.
Another example is the exchanges in buyer-seller networks [7] . The problem has been studied in the context of indivisible goods. An important scenario is the case of divisible goods with the buyer-seller relations being exclusive. When the preferences for the goods are strictly convex, continuous and strongly monotone, we observe a connected contract curve or the set of individually rational pareto-efficient exchanges between any adjacent buyerseller pair in the network. As we move along the contract curve in a given direction, the utility of buyer/seller strictly decreases and the utility of seller/buyer strictly increases. The stable set of exchanges in this network is the one in which all exchanges are stable or no adjacent buyer-seller pair in the network can do better by simultaneously breaking their current contracts and forming a new contract among them.
An important example is the study of bargaining in networks. This problem has recently been studied widely and takes the form of the stable matching problem in teh case of linear utilities. However, often in real life bargaining situations, the utility is non-trasferable between the bargaining parties through a quasilinear numeraire. In such situations as the sum of offers to the two parties in bargaining is not constant. A stable bargaining solution in this case takes a different form as studied in this paper. Another line of work that can benefit by the results in this paper is the work on social games introduced in [5] .
The organization of the rest of the paper is as such. In the next section, we introduce the setup. We try to maintain the notations close to the notations in the matching literature while introduce additional terminology as required. In section 3, we show introduce some important concepts that are needed to prove the existence of a stable matching. Finally in section 4, we show a contructive proof and an algorithm to find the stable matching.
Setup
In this section we formulate the problem and introduce necessary terminology.
Network and Payoffs
Assume A and B are two finite and mutually exclusive sets of nodes and X = A ∪ B. A bipartite network between A and B is a graph S = (X, E ⊆ A × B), whose nodes belong to X and whose edges connect nodes from A to nodes in B. Given a bipartite network S, we will refer to the set of nodes as X S , the sets of nodes in A and B as A S and B S respectively, and the set of edges as E S when necessary. When the node set X is understood, we will refer to the network by the edge set E. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the graph S is connected.
A set of nodes
The set of neighbors of a node i ∈ A is Nbr S (i) = {j ∈ B : (i, j) ∈ E}. The set of neighbors of a node of j ∈ B is Nbr S (j) = {i ∈ A : (i, j) ∈ E}. When the context is well understood, we will also refer to Nbr S (i) as Nbr E (i) or just Nbr (i). The set of neighboring
A weight function w : E → R + assigns a weight to each edge. An edge (i, j) with i ∈ A and j ∈ B has a weight w (i, j) that can be split between i and j.
A split s (i,j) on the edge (i, j) is the pair (s i , s j ), with s i + s j = w (i, j).
The nodes derive payoffs from the part of the split given to them. For a split s (i,j) , the payoff of the node i is u i (j, s i ) and the payoff of the node j is u j (i, s j ). The payoff of a node depends upon both the part of the split given to the node and the edge on which the split is made. Thus for each edge the payoff of a node is a unique function of the part of the split given to the person. We assume that these payoff functions are strictly increasing and continuous and hence they are invertible and the inverse functions are also strictly increasing and continuous.
We also define payoffs of nodes as a function of its neighbor when the split is made between them. The payoff of node j for the split on edge (i, j) is a function of the payoff of
. So the payoffs of neighboring nodes for the split between them are strictly decreasing and continuous with respect to one another. For
A weighted matching is stable if ∀ (i, j) ∈ E and all splits s (i,j) on (i, j),
Paths
A path in the network S is a subgraph P = X P , E P , where X P ⊆ A ∪ B is a set of nodes and E P is a set of edges with both end points in X P such that two nodes in X P have exactly one edge in E P and all other nodes in X P have exactly two edges in E P . The two nodes with exactly one edge will be referred to as the end nodes. A path also induces index function over its nodes as follows:
1. Pick an end node and set its index as 0. This node is the source node.
2. Set i ← last indexed node. This index generates a sequence of nodes {x P n } where the subscript stands for the index and x P 0 and x P |X| are end nodes. Thus a path P of length N can be seen as a sequence {x n } n∈{0,...,N } of nodes in A ∪ B, such that ∀n < N, (x n , x n+1 ) ∈ E. We call this a path from the source to the sink node.
Alternatively, a path is a sequence of nodes such that for each node in the sequence shares edges with both the immediately preceding and immediately succeeding nodes. When the source and sink is determined for the path P , we will refer a path from the source i to sink j as P i,j . The reverse path from j to i will be refered to as P j,i .
A subpath P ′ of a path P is a connected subgraph of the path P . Alternatively, a subpath P ′ ⊆ P between nodes x m , x M ∈ X P is a subsequence {x P n } n∈{m,...,M } . A subpath is a path by itself.
The union of two paths P 1 and P 2 is also a path P 3 = P 1 ∪ P 2 if P 1 and P 2 share exactly one end node.
We will denote the set of paths from i to j in a network S as P S i,j .
Offers
An offer profile is a vector O ∈ R A∪B where the element O i is node i's offer. We will denote the restriction of an offer profile O to a set of nodes X as O |X .
An offer profile O is feasible, if ∃ M, s M weighted matching, with payoff profile U M, s M =
O.
Using the definition and properties of the pareto payoff functions, we can reformulate the stable matching problem as such. Find a matching M • and a split s such that
The first, second and fourth inequalities provide the constraints for the offer profile to be feasible and the third inequality provide the constraints for the offer profile to be stable.
Thus, if we have a feasible and stable offer profile, then we have a weighted stable matching.
Hence, in this paper, we will focus on finding a feasible and stable offer profile.
Given an offer profile O, the equality subgraph EQ (O) is the subset of edges E with
We will refer to the neighbors of a node i in the equality subgraph EQ (O) as Nbr EQ(O) (i).
Given an offer profile O, a path P is feasible if E P ⊆ EQ (O).
Given a node i with offer o i ≥ 0, a path P with an end node i induces an offer for each node x P n in the path as follows:
For any pair of nodes i, j and a path P from i to j, we define the path induced offer function f P i,j : R → R where f P i,j (x) is the offer that P induces for j given i has the offer x. Clearly, f P i,j is continuous since the pareto payoff functions are continuous. Also f P i,j is strictly increasing if both i, j ∈ A or both i, j ∈ B and strictly decreasing if either i ∈ A and j ∈ B or i ∈ B and j ∈ A since pareto payoff functions are strictly decreasing.
Given a node i with offer x and another node i ′ , a path P * i,i ′ from i to i ′ is maximum offer inducing path from i to i ′ given the offer x on i if
The maximum offer inducing paths and the maximum path induced offers have important properties that we will use for the main result. In the following two lemmas we state these properties.
Lemma 1. Assume i, i
′ ∈ A and x ∈ R. Assume P * i,i ′ is a maximum offer inducing path from i to i ′ given the offer
′′ is a maximum offer inducing path from i to i ′′ given the offer x on i.
Proof. The proof follows from the principle of optimality [2] and is omitted.
For all j ∈ B, set
Then the following hold true about the equality subgraph EQ (O)
1. the equality subgraph EQ (O) is connected and the offer profile O is stable. Therefore all nodes j ∈ B have at least one edge in the equality subgraph.
Proof. Consider all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length 2.
Pick any of such nodes i ′ and its neighbor j along the maximum offer inducing path. Clearly
, the inequality exists because the functions v are strictly increasing. This implies that O i ′′ is not the maximum path induced offer induced on
Now assume that all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length less than n is connected to i through a maximum offer inducing path. Then following lemma 1 for all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length n all nodes in A along the path are connected to i along the same path. Also by a similar argument as above all nodes in A for which the maximum offer inducing path is of length n is connected to i through a maximum offer inducing path. Thus by induction, all nodes in A are connected to i through a maximum offer inducing path. As a consequence all nodes in B that belong to any of the maximum offer inducing paths are also connected to i through the respective maximum offer inducing paths.
Now since all nodes in B that do not belong to any maximum offer inducing paths are connected to at least one node in A, therefore they are also connected to i through some path. Hence the equality subgraph is connected. The offer profile is stable because for all
We now prove the second claim. Assume that there exists (i ′ , j) ∈ E \ EQ (O) and path
that does not include any of the nodes in Nbr EQ(O) (j). Then pick a node i ′′ ∈ Nbr EQ(O) (j) and consider the path
This is a contradiction because by construction of O, O i ′′ was the maximum offer induced on i ′′ over all paths from i to i ′′ given the offer x on i. Hence the claims holds true.
We now prove the third claim. Assume there exists 
, then the path 
Pick a node i ′′ ∈ Nbr EQ(O) (j ′′ ) and consider the subpaths P i,i * ⊂ P i,i ′ . The path
′′ } induces the following offers:
This is a contradiction because by construction of O, O i ′′ was the maximum offer induced on i ′′ over all paths from i to i ′′ given the offer x on i. Hence, all paths from i to j
include at least one node in Nbr EQ(O) (j ′′ ).
We now prove the the fourth claim. Assume that there exists (i ′ , j ′ ) ∈ E \ EQ (O) and path P i,i ′ from i to i ′ in S that does not include any of the nodes in Nbr EQ(O) (j ′ ). Then pick a node i ′′ ∈ Nbr EQ(O) (j ′ ) and consider the path
Alternating Paths, Alternating Trees and Near-Perfect Matchings
Given an offer profile O and a matching M ⊆ EQ (O), an alternating path is a path within the equality subgraph EQ (O) with alternating pair of nodes share an edge in the matching and not in the matching M.
The matching also induces directionality on the alternating paths in the following way.
Direct all edges (i, j) ∈ M from j to i and all edges (i, j) / ∈ M from i to j.
An augmenting path is an alternating path that starts and ends at an unmatched vertex.
An alternating tree for a matching M is a tree T M which contains exactly one unmatched node r and has following properties:
• every node at odd distance from r has degree 2 in the tree
• all paths from r are alternating paths
• all leaf nodes are at even distance from r Clearly, every alternating tree has one more node at even distance from r than at odd distance from r.
is a maximum matching in the equality subgraph
can be obtained using the augmenting path algorithm [10] . A matching M is a Given a maximum matching M * (O) ⊆ EQ (O) and an alternating tree T , an expanding node is a node i ′ ∈ A T with an edge with j ′ ∈ B \ B T . We will refer C T to be the set of expanding nodes for the tree T and for each i ′ ∈ C T , the respective expanding offer
We will also refer to that has a near-perfect matching generating an alternating spanning tree. Then:
• Every B ′ ⊆ B has least |B ′ | + 1 neighboring nodes in A.
• Every A ′ ⊂ A has at least |A ′ | neighboring nodes in B.
Proof. Pick any subset B ′ ⊆ B. Since all nodes in B are matched in a near-perfect matching, then from the Hall's theorem [6] , B ′ has edges to at least |B ′ | nodes in A. Since all nodes in B ′ are interior nodes of an alternating tree, therefore, each node in B ′ has one unique child it is matched to and one parent it is not matched to. Clearly, there is one parent node different from all the child nodes, or else, there will be a loop in the alternating tree. Hence, B ′ has edges to at least |B ′ | + 1 nodes in A in the alternating tree within the network S. with the following properties:
1. ∀j ∈ B, j is not a leaf node in T .
2. ∀j ∈ B, j has exactly one child node in T . 
Stable Alternating Spanning Tree Generating Offer Profiles
In this section, we introduce three main lemmas about the existence, uniqueness and strict monotonicity of the stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profiles. Using this,
we prove the main theorem of this section that helps extend the Hungarian algorithm to find the generalized stable matching. The main theorem introduces a set of continuous and strictly monotonic offer generating functions for each pair of nodes in the bipartite network. •
•
The resulting inequalities are strict when the conditioning inequalities are strict.
Proof. We only need to prove the first statement and the rest follow similarly. To prove the first inequality, assume that O 
and M • (O 2 ) be the associated near perfect matchings and
) be the associated alternating spanning trees. Clearly
Without loss of generality assume that i is unmatched in both
. In both alternating spanning trees, the nodes at even distances from i belong to A and the nodes at odd distances from i belong to B. Define
, the parents and children of nodes in BM 
Therefore all the sets AM 
Proof. Clearly, there is no i ′ ∈ A, with O
Since both offer profiles are stable, therefore following the lemma 4:
1. In the alternating tree
, the parents and children of nodes in AM
In the alternating tree
, the parents and children of nodes in BM
Since, the nodes at odd distance in the alternating trees have exactly one child, and all nodes have exactly one parent, therefore using 1, we have |BM 
. Hence the lemma is true when |B| = 1.
Now assume that the lemma is true for all 1 ≤ |B| < n. We will show that the lemma is true for |B| = n. Pick i ∈ A and o i < O i .
• For all j ∈ B, set O
From lemma 2 the equality subgraph EQ (O ′ ) is connected and the offer profile O ′ is stable. Also all nodes j ∈ B have at least one edge in the equality subgraph. Pick a maximum matching M * in EQ (O ′ ) and the alternating forest F * = F M * with respect to the matching M * . If F * has exactly one alternating tree that spans all nodes in X, then O * = O ′ is the desired offer profile and the lemma is true for |B| = n. Otherwise, we proceed as follows. We will denote:
the set of nodes in the Hungarian forest that belong to A and B respectively.
• A For t=0, set
• EQ t = EQ (O t ).
• M t = M * and F t = F * .
At any time t, pick i t and the alternating tree T t . By lemma 3 there exists an expanding node i ′ ∈ C T t with an expanding offer 
• EQ t+1 = EQ (O t+1 ).
• Since, O t+1 |X T t is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile within the subgraph S |X T t , therefore there is a unique near-perfect matching M *
If there exists an augmenting path from i t with respect to the matching M t+1 within the equality subgraph EQ t+1 , then switch the edges within the matching and outside the matching along the augmenting path to create a new matching M t+1 . Clearly this is a maximum matching in EQ t+1 because there does not exist any other augmenting paths in EQ t+1 . F t+1 is the Hungarian forest induced by the matching M t+1 in the equality subgraph EQ t+1 .
out .
• If the matching size changed, then set m
is the new alternating tree rooted at i
We now show that the Hungarian forest satisfies certain properties at all time t.
Proposition 2. The following hold about the Hungarian forest at any time t:
• |B
• There is no edge between a node in A F t and a node in B F t out in the equality subgraph
In other words, all the neighbors of B • All edges in the matching
• The number of alternating trees in the Hungarian forest is one more than the number of unmatched nodes in B 
between node i ′ and another node j ′ ∈ B, then:
• if the edge is in matching M t , then the alternating path from the root of the alternating tree T to i ′ includes j ′ and hence j ′ / ∈ B F t out .
• if the edge is not in the matching M * , then the alternating path from the root of the alternating tree T to i ′ can be extended to include j ′ . Hence,
Hence, the second claim follows and the third claim follows from it.
We now prove the fourth claim. The number of unmatched nodes in B We also observe that the offer profile O t is stable at any time t as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. At any time t, the offer profile O t is stable.
Proof. From 2, we know that the offer profile is stable at t = 0.
Assume that for some t ≥ 0, the offer profile O t is stable. At iteration t + 1, if the offers change, then:
From the construction of O t+1 , and by lemma 6 we know that:
The edges in E can be divided into four mutually exclusive subsets:
From the construction, since O t+1 |X T t is a stable alternating spanning tree generating offer profile within the subgraph S |X T t , therefore,
Since O t was stable therefore
From the construction of O t+1 and the stability of O t and since the pareto payoff functions are strictly decreasing therefore
Therefore we see that
and hence the offer profile O t+1 is stable.
By induction at any iteration t ≥ 0, the offer profile O t is stable.
We also notice the following about the structural properties of the Hungarian forest and the offer profile at any time t in the following proposition.
We now prove the third claim. first we note that B \ B We now observe cetain properties of the equality subgraph outside the Hungarian forest at all times in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. At any time t ≥ 0, the following hold:
1. If there is more than one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest, then for all j ∈ B, such that there is an alternating path P j,i ⊆ EQ t from j to i, for all nodes
2. Assume that at time t + 1 the alternating tree T t connects to a joining node j ∈ D T t = Nbr E A T t \ B T t such that there is an alternating path P j,i ⊆ EQ t from j to i,. Let J ⊂ D T t be the set of joining nodes that the tree T t connects to at time t + 1. Then each node in D T t can be reached on alternating paths from nodes in J in EQ t .
If i belongs to the alternating tree
4. If there is more than one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest, the the node i does not belong to the Hungarian forest.
Proof. Clearly, the first claim hold at t = 0.
For the fourth claim at t = 0, assume that there is more than one alternating tree in the Hungarian forest and i belongs to the Hungarian forest. Assume without loss of generality that i belongs to an alternating tree T . Then A T ⊂ A has at least |A T | neighbors in S. Since T has |A T | − 1 nodes in B T , therefore at least one of these neighbors is outside T . Pick one such neighbor j ′ ∈ B \ B T . By lemma 2, since the tree T contains i, therefore, T contains at
and i ′ ∈ A T , therefore by proposition 2, j ′ ∈ B T . This contradicts our assumption that j ′ is outside the alternating tree. Hence by contradiction, the fourth claim holds at t = 0.
Assume the first and the fourth claims hold for some t ≥ 0. Then at t + 1 if for any node
be in the alternating tree B T t at t. This means that i was in the alternating tree at t which is a contradiction. Hence, the first claim is satisfied at t + 1. Therefore by induction claim 1 holds true.
At t + 1, assume that the alternating tree T t connects to a joining node j that has an alternating path to i. Let J ⊂ D T t be the set of joining nodes that the tree T t connects to at time t + 1. Pick any j ′ ∈ Nbr E A T t \ B T t and assume that j ′ is not reachable from an alternating path from any node in J in EQ t . Clearly, then j ′ is not reachable from an alternating path from any node in J in EQ t+1 . Pick 
• } is reachable by an alternating path from any node in J. Consider the paths
The offer induced on i • by the path P i,i • for the offer o i on i is
This is a contradiction because by the definition of
• is the maximum path induced offer on i
• for the offer o i on i. Hence by contradiction, the second claim holds.
We now prove the third claim. Assume that at time t i belongs to the alternating tree
By proposition 4, j ′ is reachable by an alternating path From the assumption, no node in X P j • ,j ′ ∪ {i • } belongs to the alternating tree T t . Consider the paths P i,i ′ ⊂ EQ t ,P j ′ ,j • ⊂ EQ t and the path P i,i The fourth claim follows from the first claim as follows. Assume i does not belong to the Hungarian forest until time t − 1. Assume i belongs to the Hungarian forest at time t which implies that at time t, T t−1 connected to a node j with an alternating path to i and hence i belongs to the alternating tree T t . Since there are more than one alternating trees in the Hungarian forest, then |A T t | < |A|, and therefore there is at least one joining node j ′ ∈ D T t that T t can connect to by some expanding node i ′ ∈ A T t . This contradicts claim 3 that
Hence i does not belong to the Hungarian forest at time t. By induction, claim 4 holds.
Proposition 6. At any time t, if the Hungarian forest has only one alternating tree T t , and this alternating tree contains i, then this alternating tree spans all nodes in X.
Proof. Since the Hungarian forest has only one alternating tree T t and it contains i, then by proposition 5,
Therefore T t spans all nodes in X.
• f Proof. From lemmas 7 and 5, we know that the functions f 
Algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm to find a stable and feasible offer profile for a bipartite network S. Existence of a stable and feasible offer profile proves the existence of a stable weighted matching in S. The algorithm is described as follows.
Initialization
We first define an initial offer profile O 0 and the initial matching as follows. 
Iteration
We iteratively change the offer profile to create a sequence of offer profiles. At each time t ≥ 0, we compute the new offer profile O t+1 as follows.
While I t = φ, pick T t .
1. ∀i ∈ C T t , set the expanding offer 
